CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen
•167 made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

175 conquered lands. Generally, the Berbers fought assimilation and change when and where they could, just as they had in their confrontations with the Greeks and Romans. But as the Arabs took more and more of the "sown" lands of North Africa, Berber resistance decreased. Only in mountainous areas, such as the Kabyle region (from the Arabic qabaa'il, i.e., "tribes"), were the Berbers successful against the Arabization process.

Around the time of 908 A.D., the Ismaili Shi'a sect, based in the Yemen, established a western mission in Tunisia. This outpost grew into the Fatimid Dynasty, and in 969 the Fatimids were able to capture Egypt from the central Islamic empire. By the 11th century they had reached their zenith as a religious and political power. At this time, their rule was threatened internally by two Bedouin tribes, the Bedouin element in Egypt, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim.

175 In his Histoire des Berberes (trans. 1925), Ibn Khaldun
167 states that the original homeland of these two tribes was the Najd area of Arabia. They were dangerous predators who spent their summers raiding along the frontiers of Syria and Iraq: the Banu Sulaim even attacked pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca (1925:28-166). Some segments of these tribes found their way into the delta region of Egypt where they became troublesome to the Fatimid Caliph, and were promptly exiled into Upper
175 Egypt. Apparently, they were responsible for discord among the other tribes there, for in an attempt to solve two problems

175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 169 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their [103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
• 167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 619 726 167 [648] Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.
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•167 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they [131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts.. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
179 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
• 167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

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619 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of
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619 analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been
563 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such
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619 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many
[167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

the steep sides of which make east–west journeys slow and arduous. To the west this broken country levels down, and in a bay in the hills lies the extensive treeless, but very fertile, basin of al-Marj, known to Europeans as the Barce Plain. It was colonized in classical times and again recently by the Italians. The Arabs call this first terrace *lusaita* (*al-wasaita*), the middle part, because it lies between the coastal plain and the plateau tableland formed by *al-zahir*, the second terrace. This tableland is famous for its Graeco-Roman ruins and is dotted also with the deserted farms of Italian colonists. It mounts to a narrow third terrace, at about 875 metres above sea level, from the top of which one can look down on these settlements.

The plateau slopes southwards through a juniper belt. There forest ends and it continues to roll to the southern steppe in stony undulations dissected by many wadis. In the plain at its foot there is plenty of grass and low scrub, and vegetation is thick in depressions, but the country becomes increasingly desolate the farther to the south one journeys towards the lifeless wastes of the Sahara. The eastern part of Cyrenaica is more arid than the west or centre. The Marmarica, the *batnan* of the Arabs, is characterized by low hills rising from the coastal belt and prolonged towards the south to create a succession of crests of several kilometres in depth. The mean annual rainfall is low and wells are restricted to the coastal belt. However, there is, probably in most years, a certain amount of grazing to some fifty miles from the coast during the rains. The Sirtica, the extension of Cyrenaica to the west, is a vast rolling treeless plain traversed by a series of wadis running north–south which in their spread provide most of the summer grazing. Wells are found only near the coast but pasturage is plentiful till the Wadi al-Farigh is reached.

The rainfall very exactly determines the vegetation belts and thereby limits human distribution and imposes a certain way of life. The amount of precipitation depends on a number of circumstances. Mean annual rainfall decreases from west to east. Altitude also affects it. More significant, however, are the variation with latitude, the seasonal rhythm, and annual irregularities. The accompanying map shows how rainfall decreases rapidly from the coast, how only the very limited plateau area is subject to heavy precipitations (400–550 mms.),

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 33]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

and the insufficiency of the fall elsewhere. It follows that only on the plateau can there be forest, and only there is a settled and purely agricultural way of life possible; and it was there and on the coastal fringe that in ancient and modern times European colonists settled.

The rains in Cyrenaica fall only in winter, from October to April. In the absence of irrigation the planting season is thus clearly delimited. So is the grazing season to the south of the plateau, for in summer the grasses wither and the wells dry up, compelling shepherds to drive their flocks northwards to the plateau, thus producing the kind of seasonal nomadism known as transhumance. The variation in total rainfall from year to year and the distribution of its fall over the winter months are of the utmost importance for agriculturalists in Cyrenaica. There is still some obscurity, but it is an observed fact that every few years in Cyrenaica there is a year in which the fall of rain is insufficient, or too badly distributed, to raise an adequate crop. In a mixed economy this fact must have given an overwhelming bias towards pastoralism.

The water supplies of the plateau, which depend entirely on rainfall, are sufficient for the needs of the Bedouin and their flocks. The clayey soils are, however, very exacting and running spring water is rare, being for the most part restricted to the triangle Darna–Slanta–al-Haniya. On the western part of the plateau water is conserved in cisterns and wells and on the maritime and *barqa* plains, in the Sirtica and Marmarica, and generally to the south of the plateau, in wells.

The distribution of vegetation in Cyrenaica follows variation in degree of precipitation. Where there is much rain there is forest. Where there is little rain there is steppe. Where there is no rain there is desert. The forest is thick but mainly squat and of very limited extension. An Italian estimate[1] of its distribution is shown on the accompanying map. It is predominantly Mediterranean in type, the juniper and the lentisk being the two commonest trees of the country. Forest ceases a few miles to the south of the high watershed of the plateau and gives way to steppe. The well-known route Tariq 'Aziza is generally regarded as the dividing line between the two kinds

[1] Dott. Giovanni Manzoni, 'Memorie sui boschi della Cirenaica', *Notiziario Economico della Cirenaica*, 1929.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them. Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin *naja'*, camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approximate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the population is badly distributed between town and country, the urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1] The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345, excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

433 511 182 182 167 361 161 162 161 175 [113]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan-Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

of the more independent client tribes. In other words, all the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are nomadic in some degree, some more and some less, and Col. De Agostini rightly stresses that whether they move much or little they all have the same characteristics when compared to peasants and townsmen.[1] They are all *bwadi*, as the Cyrenaican dialect has it, people of the tents, and they see themselves as a single people against the *hadur*, the citizens.

I have so far said nothing of the towns of Cyrenaica or of their inhabitants. They play a minor part in this story, which is about the Bedouin, but they cannot be entirely left out of it on account of their economic and political relations with the Bedouin, so I take this opportunity to give a brief account of them.[2]

Banghazi, which is supposed to be called after the saint Sidi Ghazi, buried in the town, is on the site of the classical Berenice. It is believed that after the disappearance of the Graeco-Roman community the site was unoccupied till the fifteenth century, when it was reoccupied by immigrants from the mercantile communities of the Tripolitanian coast, among whom Misuratans, both Muslims and Jews, preponderated in numbers and wealth. The Genoese Della Cella, who passed through the fly-infested town in 1817–18, in the time of the Caramanlis, says that it then contained about 5,000 inhabitants, at least half of whom were Jews.[3] Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman al-Hashaishi, who was in the town in 1896, says that the greater part of the traders were immigrants from Sfax and the Island of Jerba—he was himself a Tunisian and often tended to exaggerate Tunisian influence—with some Greeks and a few Italians. 'As to the Turks, they do not give themselves to trade.' At this time Banghazi was a very simple, mostly mud-and-rubble, town, and the learned Shaikh makes a point of telling us that there were no posts or telegraphs, nor even a railway, save a line of three kilometres joining the official

[1] Ibid., pp. 32–3.

[2] The historical information is chiefly derived from Agostini, ibid., pp. 413–43.

[3] Paolo Della Cella, *Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817*, 1822, pp. 194–5. (First published in 1819.) F. W. and H. W. Beechey (*Proceedings of the Expedition to explore the Northern Coast of Africa from Tripoly Eastward in 1821 and 1822*, 1828, p. 299) consider Della Cella's estimate too high. Theirs is 2,000.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the leading tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban education and they acted as links between the citizen communities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with town merchants and officials what was happening in the world outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered. But though maintaining communications with the towns, neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on the country and not the country on the towns, because there was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry of Tripolitania.

Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian, Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order and whose country and way of life I have described are divided into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them from Arabia.

The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber-speakers are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies, and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica. In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt, Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically, the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the

[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4,5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

619 two countries are weak. On the other hand, Cyrenaican tribes and tribal sections, notably the Aulad 'Ali tribe, speaking the same dialect and with the same customs as their cousins still in Cyrenaica, stretch unbroken from al-Sallum to Alexandria, and are also numerous in the Bahaira province of Egypt and in the Fayum. The Cyrenaican Arabs form to-day numerically by far the most important Bedouin element in Egypt, and apart from those who have remained tented there, there are many who have settled on the land.

*195 619 In its general outline the history of the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is well known. 'Amr ibn al-'As, during the Caliphate of 'Umar, conquered Syria and Egypt and in 643 overran Cyrenaica, then occupied by Berber tribes and under the nominal rule of Byzantium. He met with little resistance, and within seventy years the whole of North Africa, from Sinai to the Atlantic, was in Muslim hands. It seems, however, that the original conquerors only settled as garrisons in the coastal towns, and neither controlled the hinterland nor had any considerable ethnic influence on its Berber peoples. Bedouin settlement on a big scale and the complete Arabization of the indigenous Berber population took place from 1050 or 1051 in the famous Hilalian migration.

*195 • 167 619 The Bani Sulaim and the Bani Hilal came originally from Nadj. They are of Mudarid stock, the Bani Sulaim being the senior branch. They passed into Upper Egypt as a result of the check to the Carmathian movement in Arabia, in which they were involved, and settled there; but they were inclined to be troublesome in a country little suited to their traditional way of life, so during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir, his Vizier encouraged them to reconquer Tripoli and Tunis from the Berbers, who had again asserted their independence. Arab historians have compared their migration to that of locusts or wolves. The Bani Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia, where many Bedouin tribes claim descent from them to-day. The Bani Sulaim mostly settled in Cyrenaica. It must be added that the nobility and the historical exploits of their forbears are for the most part unknown to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica.

619 The present-day descendants of the Bani Sulaim are spread from Egypt to Tunisia. Those of Cyrenaica are divided into

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef, Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir, aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi, the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi, being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on their behalf when prices rise.

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their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest: the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the *'Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad (Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land, do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. Moreover, one has only to note that the predominance of the leading sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the relationship between them and the owners of the country is often one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the powerful Bara'asa tribe is the *'Ailat* Hadduth which in De Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading section of the 'Awaqir, the *'Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.
[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

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find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the 'Abidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin* tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

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Jarbi, and had been educated in Turco-Arab schools in the country, and a few at Istanbul. Most, however, were less reputable and had a record of close and active collaboration with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders of 'friendlies', and overseers in concentration camps. When the fighting was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their only friends in the country, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which they had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they often found them an embarrassment and had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. Before the last European war they were being slowly replaced by a new class of officials brought up in the towns under Italian rule and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These *évolués* showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their repugnance to the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as a punishment. But if they had no strong sense of loyalty to their own people they likewise had none to their masters. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean more to them than payment of subscriptions. They knew moreover that the swarms of Italian immigrants settling like locusts on Cyrenaica would spell disaster to them no less than to the rest of the Arab population. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the late war the Italians watched them closely for *disfattismo politico*, and not without cause, for they showed themselves very ready to co-operate with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica, and some, including ten senior officials, showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retire with the British forces in their second retreat to Egypt.

The Bedouin accepted all these Italian measures, good and bad, with resignation and indifference. They were powerless to oppose them, but as far as possible they ignored them. Plagued with concentration camps, loss of stock, confiscation of arms, rape of sowing and pasture grounds, the pass system, corrupt officials, and neglect of their Shaikhs, they found the odd mosque, school, and clinic poor consolation and retired

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Weisse Götter, who avoided all contact with the natives that was not unavoidable, and they rejected also the French policy of cultural assimilation and social and political equality with the *évolués*.[1] In 1938 the Under-Secretary for Italian Africa, Teruzzi, the ex-Governor of Cyrenaica, described the fundamental principle of Fascist native policy as a steering between the Anglo-Saxon colour bar and the French policy of assimilation which was not merely a middle course but an entirely new direction. At the same time he rejected the concept of indirect rule 'which leaves to the native chiefs very wide autonomy, not only administrative but also political, and which leads therefore inevitably to a slow detachment of the colony from the mother country'. The Italian policy was to regard their colonies as extensions of Italy beyond the seas.[2]

Had the Italians been content, as in the first years of their occupation, to restrict their immigration to the towns, where there was scope for a new element as traders, artisans, officials, and professional men, a symbiosis might have developed, for the Arabs were at that time incapable of these functions on an adequate scale, and the problem of adjustment might never have become acute; but when they began to organize mass colonization of the country-side, questions of status and racial interrelations appeared to present no other solution than that proposed. Even had racial miscegenation not been prohibited it could hardly have taken place between Catholic Italians and Muslim Arabs. Cultural assimilation was also unlikely because both Italians and Arabs were civilized peoples with a long cultural history behind them and it was most improbable that the Arabs would give up their religion, law, and language. No other solution seemed feasible, therefore, than that advocated by Balbo, the policy of parallel development in cultural matters and structural co-ordination within the framework of the Fascist State. The Arabs were to remain Arabs in speech, religion, personal law, customs, and manners, but their tribal structure was to disappear and its place was to be taken by political and economic institutions similar to those of their Italian fellow Libyans. 'We shall have in Libya not rulers and ruled, but

[1] Oskar Schmieder and Herbert Wilhelmy, *Die faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika*, 1939, pp. 79–80.

[2] Italo Neri, 'Politica Indigena', *Riv. delle Col. It.*, 1938, pp. 1391–2.

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Catholic Italians and Muslim Italians, the one and the other united in the enviable fortune of being the constructive elements in a great and mighty organism, the Fascist Empire. Rome will thus show herself to be once again and always the grand and fruitful Mother of peoples.'[1] Arabs and Italians would share like institutions in the same corporate State, though remaining culturally and racially distinct, it being understood, however, that the institutions would be like, not common, and that the Italian colonists and officials would always occupy a superior position politically and economically.

It was hoped that when the Bedouin tribal and kinship structure had been broken down and their social life had been remodelled on Fascist corporative lines, both Arabs and colonists would accept a situation they could not alter and tolerate each other in the realization that, though their immediate interests might sometimes clash, co-operation was to the final advantage of both. It was believed also that any jealousy the Arabs might feel about the disparity between the political status and economic privileges of the two peoples would be overcome by the natural aptitude of all Italians for meeting other peoples as social equals. In the end the two races would feel themselves bound together by a community of economic interests in loyalty to a common *Patria* and a common *Duce*. Clearly such rugged individualists as the Bedouin were did not fit into this picture. The Bedouin would, therefore, have to go.

In pursuance of this policy of parallel development the Italians under Balbo's direction made serious efforts to improve the material condition of the Arabs. New wells were dug, stock was improved, zootechnical stations were started, and educational and medical services were expanded. An effort was made to persuade the Arabs that they would receive consideration commensurate with that accorded by a paternal administration to its own nationals. Arab agricultural villages were built as well as metropolitan agricultural villages, metropolitan schools were balanced by Arab schools, the hospitals had Arab wards as well as Italian wards, there were Colonial battalions and Libyan battalions, there were Colonial Fascist organizations and Arab Fascist organizations, and the Government built mosques as well as churches. It may be doubted whether these

[1] Op. cit., p. 22.

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measures would have convinced the Bedouin that they were compensated for the loss of their kinsmen, their lands, and their independence. In the event they were inadequate and they came too late.

Italian policy in Cyrenaica, like the colonial policies of other European powers, was full of contradictions. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss them, but I would draw the reader's attention to the changes this policy underwent during the thirty years between their occupation of the country and their embroilment in the late war. They were tactical changes demanded by the development of local, domestic, and international situations. There was no fundamental difference between the aims of the Fascist Government and the aims of pre-Fascist Governments. All intended to wrest Cyrenaica from its inhabitants by force of arms and by peopling it with Italians to exploit it for Italian economic, political, and above all strategic, purposes. They were attempting no more than other Colonial Powers had done before them, but they had waited too long, till the tide of colonial expansion was turning and the right of Europeans to rob native peoples of their lands was beginning to be challenged. Even so, it was not of their choosing or out of deference to humane considerations, but on account of military weakness and incompetence, that they made a truce with the Sanusi in 1917, and on account of domestic difficulties that they prolonged this truce to 1923. As soon as Mussolini had restored order in Italy he resumed the war Giolitti had begun, although he had been one of the most hostile critics of it at the time. When Graziani had crushed resistance the original plan of colonization was acted on. The migratory swarms from Italy of peasants, officials, traders, and hangers-on of all kinds, threatened the very existence of the Bedouin, who saw themselves being forced either to eke out their lives in the desert as a scarcely tolerated class of shepherds or to sink to the level of landless wage-earners in the country districts and of unskilled labourers in the towns. The Italians intended this to be their fate,[1] and it might well have been if events in Europe had not

[1] Giuseppe Daodiace, 'Latinità e colonizzazione nell' Africa del nord', *Riv. delle Col. e d'Oriente*, Feb. 1927, pp. 13–14; Filippo Lo Bello, *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925, p. 38; and Paolo D'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, *L'Italia nella politica africana*, 1926, p. 132.

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first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

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tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Government considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feelings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasiness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship,

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day is always just ahead', as they say. Nothing could compensate them for the loss of their lands taken from them to make farms for Italian immigrants.

When the Italians invaded Libya in 1911 they did so not only to keep other European powers out of it but also to provide an outlet for their surplus population.[1] Sentiment also played a great part in their plans, especially under the Fascists. In classical times and for over a thousand years Europeans had flourished in Cyrenaica, and the country had once been part of the Roman Empire. To sentiment were added plausible arguments of an economic kind. Italy imported some of her elementary requirements, such as grain and oil, from countries controlled by other European powers and it was hoped that her Libyan colonies might supply part of these and so, through colonization, make a contribution to the autarchy its rulers aimed at. But sentiment and demographic and economic aims weighed less in the calculations of Italy's leaders than the political and strategic advantages likely to accrue from the adventure, both of which would be served by colonization.

It was, of course, well known to the Italians that only a small portion of Cyrenaica, part of the plateau, was suitable for European colonization. The findings of the Anglo-Jewish commission of 1908 had been far from encouraging, for they expressed the opinion that Cyrenaica could not take more than about three hundred thousand colonists in addition to the existing population, even when the maximum point of exploitation had been reached.[2] Many Italians also were sceptical about the advantages of the country for colonial settlement, but most took the more optimistic view and believed, or affected to believe, that an America lay opposite their shores. Indeed, as Despois observes, many Italian books and articles on colonization of Libya 'lack the most elementary competence or the least critical sense.'[3] But though there was much disagreement about the saturation point most Italian writers accepted that political control and colonization must go hand in hand.

In the first years of Italian occupation political conditions did not permit colonization on any scale. It was restricted to cereal culture in comparatively safe areas near Banghazi and

[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 257, seq.
[2] Gregory, op. cit., pp. 12–14.
[3] Op. cit., p. 137.

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behind barbed wire in the vicinity of al-Marj and al-Abyar, and up to the end of 1926 there were only 13 colonists, possessing 630 hectares. Even by the end of 1932, in spite of Teruzzi's fervent efforts and the personal interest of Mussolini, there were still only about 90 Italian farms in the whole country and the farming, mostly by concessions and private company settling, was often uneconomic and incompetent. Exploitation of this kind clearly did nothing to relieve over-population in Italy and was certainly not at all what had been advertised as '*colonizzazione di popolamento*', so in 1932 there was formed by the State, and coming as time went on more and more under State control and supported by public funds, a parastatal corporation called the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Cirenaica* and, after its extension to operate also in Tripolitania, the *Ente per la colonizzazione della Libia*. The *Ente* began in a small way in Cyrenaica in 1933. The lands immediately allotted to it were 30,000 hectares in the black soil country of Shahhat-Safsaf, 4,000 hectares near al-Zawiya al-Baida, and 5,500 hectares in the neighbourhood of al-Marj. The first experimental operations were begun in the Shahhat and al-Zawiya al-Baida areas, a fertile region with a climate like that with which the colonists were familiar in their homeland. In this smiling country of the juniper, the lentisk, and the cypress began to spring up the little white Italian farms: in 1933 at Beda Littoria and Luigi di Savoia, in 1934 at Luigi Razza and Giovanni Berta, and in 1936 at Maddalena. But the progress of colonization was not quick enough for the Fascist junta—only some 300 families had been settled—and it was decided to quicken the pace, especially in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe. By the spring of 1937 there were over 700 colonist families in Cyrenaica. The pace was forced in 1938 by State-directed immigration in mass. The unit of this demographic immigration was the family, so that each farm would be a self-contained economic unit run on its own labour. The farms had been prepared and the houses built in advance and furnished down to the last pot and pan. Each farm was part of a village and attached to a centre comprising all that a paternal State considered necessary for the bodies, minds, and souls of its citizens: a clinic, a granary, a school, a Fascist club, administrative offices, and a church and priest's house.

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The first 20,000 new colonists for Libya were given a tremendous send-off in March 1938 and their settlement was completed during the following eight months. Those who came to Cyrenaica, probably more than half of the 20,000, partly went to complete the villages already in existence and partly to occupy the new holdings prepared for them at Baracca, Oberdan, D'Annunzio, and Battisti. The Cyrenaican quota of another 20,000 immigrants, the second wave of demographic colonization, was supposed to have followed in October 1939 to constitute the population of the newly constructed villages of Mameli, Sauro, and Filzi, but not all of them appear to have arrived. These two waves of mass immigration brought the number of farms to over 2,000 and the number of agricultural colonists to over 15,000 persons, making round about 50,000 Italian colonists of all kinds. Northern Cyrenaica had become in population and in appearance, as well as in law, part of Italy. Banghazi and Darna had become modern Italian towns which might well have been on the shores of Sicily or southern Italy. Modern roads cut through the plateau and for mile after mile were lined with Italian farmhouses and every few miles bisected Italian village centres. A railway ran from Banghazi to Suluq and from Banghazi to al-Marj and was in process of extension to Darna. An aqueduct was being built to carry water from Mara, near Darna, to the colonial villages as far to the west as those on the farther edge of the plain of al-Marj. Banghazi had been made into a modern port. Airlines to Banghazi ran from Rome, Tripoli, and Tubruq.

I have given a short sketch of Italian colonization of Cyrenaica only in order that the effect it had on the Bedouin may be better understood, for what concerns us is the fate of Muhammad, Mehemmed, Ahmad, and Abu Bakr, who with their flocks and herds were driven from the more fertile parts of the plateau to make way for Michele, Antonio, Italo, and Cesare. For over twenty years the Italians had been unable to colonize Cyrenaica for, as Graziani bluntly observed, 'It is plain that when one is making war one cannot plant trees, neither can one sow corn.'[1] Once resistance had been overcome it was merely a question of finding a legal formula for depriving the owners of the land of

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[1] 'Panorama economico della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1933, p. 295.

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their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of the Sanusiya properties had done.

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the *Sa'adi* tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been settled either by war or through discussion between the groups concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

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any case see them. Consequently no objections were raised—had they been raised no attention would have been paid to them—and there was legal presumption of State ownership in the fullest sense. The judges, therefore, ordered registration of the new lands in the name of the Colony. They comprised about 450,000 hectares, about a quarter of which were immediately allotted to the *Ente* for colonization. It will be noted that the State had already, before this action was taken, been bare owner of the lands as heir to the Turkish *miri* property. What it now gained in addition was, in the opinion of its lawyers, the *possesso utile*. They held further that compensation of those deprived of the use of the lands, while perhaps unnecessary, added to the juridical rigour of the proceeding. In other words, in order to make it look a little less like common robbery it was decided to make a parade of indemnification. The areas to be taken over were estimated in a non-technical way by a surveyor and a clerk of the Land Registry, and the supposed owners were summoned, told that their lands were worth so much, and that this sum would be handed over to them by the Government. Tables of succession showing the share in the land of the various members of the local group who owned it had already been prepared, and if the representatives of this tribal section agreed to the proposal the money could then be paid over on demand.

Whether the Bedouin took the money offered in compensation or not they still lost their lands. For this reason most of them took it. Though compensation was in this way offered, the document to which the recipients of it had to affix their seals or thumb-prints was not a contractual agreement for sale and purchase nor an edict of expropriation for public utility purposes, but it was a simple declaration by the owner that he renounced all his rights in the land and transferred them to the State. The Italians had now got all the lands in Cyrenaica which were of any immediate use to them. They had only to allot them to colonists and register them technically as they were required for settlement. The target figure for the zone of colonization was 900,000 hectares.[1]

There remained the question of the Bedouin who had been driven off the lands of their fathers. Clearly they could not be allowed to lead their nomadic life amid the Italian cultiva-

[1] *La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare*, vol. i, p. 552.

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

The Italian plan for the colonization of northern Cyrenaica.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942)
Sanusi

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors running north and south across the plateau were, as explained in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin flocks and herds.

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barqa*, the Marmarica, and the Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it was evident that in years of drought they could not have managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau. Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and might become more dependent on the State and more closely linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.[1] These efforts included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements. Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these

[1] Ibid., p. 622.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'[1] A pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool, was built at Nahiba (Jardis al-'Abid) and another was planned to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921 to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From 1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935 and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania. From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War. It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs. Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be doubted that they would approach the British with offers of assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany. This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's participation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

[1] Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the Lybian Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

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secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes [167] have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard. In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages. Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support even this very general assumption, since it is known that there have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

9: Murray E. K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

Chapter XVI

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN (EL MUGHARBA)[1]

"The Moor is of a free and open nature."—Othello.

General Remarks—The Arab and the Libyan—The Sa'adi Tribes and the Murabitin—Bedouins of the Northern Littoral—Awlad 'Ali—Jawabis—Jumei'at—Samalus—Shiheibat.

Sinai has been called an "epitome of Arabia", and the pilgrim certainly feels well on the way to Mecca as soon as he crosses the Suez Canal, but it is equally true that Algiers is not so very far west of the "Arab's Gate" at Alexandria. The skies of Mariut are coloured with much the same blue as those of Andalusia, and, though the Sierras are lacking, the historian instinctively begins to look for the Alhambra as soon as he crosses the causeway to Amriya. The reason is not so very far to seek, there is more of the Libyan than the Arab in the tribes that hardly a century ago flooded back into Egypt from Cyrenaica. Yet in spite of numerous resemblances, these two races are divided as the goats from the sheep by this essential difference that while the "Berbers"[2] are religious and often superstitious (traits of a converted race), his religion sits so lightly on the Arab that he has almost reverted to his early paganism. But though this is true, it is far from obvious, and a traveller will not find anyone in the Western Desert to admit that he is not of pure Arab descent.

This snobbishness was evident so long ago as the time of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who found it advisable to represent the Tuareg, as descended from a respectable but mythical Arab conqueror, Ifrikias ibn Sufi. Ibn Khaldun asserts that when Ifrikias himself returned to Arabia, the Ketama and Sanhaja tribes remained behind and became absorbed in the people of the country. All this is pure

[1] Mugharba means literally "westerners", and is used in Egypt to denote generally all the Bedouin west of the Nile. But there is a tribe in Cyrenaica who content themselves with this simple title, and so confuse the issue.

[2] All the indigenous races of North Africa are lumped together under this barbarian title by the Arab historians.